University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1970

Law Schools and Law Firms
Ralph Nader

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nader, Ralph, "Law Schools and Law Firms" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 2140.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2140

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Law Schools and Law Firms
Ralph Nader*
It was a similar ritual every year. About 550 new law students would file into venerable Austin Hall at Harvard Law
School on a September day and hear the no-nonsense dean,
Erwin N. Griswold, orient them. The good dean had the speech
down to a practiced spontaneity. He advised them that at that
instant they had become members of the legal profession, that
law firms were the backbone of the profession, that there were
no glee clubs at the Harvard Law School and that the law was
a jealous mistress. Thus was launched a process of engineering
the law student into corridor thinking and largely non-normative evaluation. It was a three-year excursus through legal
minutiae, embraced by wooden logic and impervious to what
Oliver Wendell Holmes once called the "felt necessities of our
times." It is not easy to take the very bright young minds of a
nation, envelop them in conceptual cocoons and condition their
expectations of practice to the demands of the corporate law
firm. But this is what Harvard Law School did for over a half
century to all but a resistant few of the 40,000 graduates.
The Harvard Law pattern-honed to a perfection of brilliant
myopia and superfluous rigor-became early in the century the
Olympian object of mimicry for law schools throughout the
country. Harvard also did everything it could to replicate its
educational system through its production of law school teachers, casebooks, and an almost proselytizing zeal. This system
faithfully nourished and fundamentally upheld a developing
legal order which has become more aristocratic and less responsive to the needs and strains of a complex society. In turn, the
established legal order controlled the terms of entry into the
profession in ways that fettered imagination, inhibited reform
and made alienation the price of questioning its assumptions and
proposing radical surgery.
Unreal as it may appear, the connection between the legal
establishment and the spectacular increase in the breakdown of
the legal system has rarely been made outside the fraternity.
This is due to the functional modesty of the profession, its re* Chairman of the Board, Center for Study of Responsive Law,
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luctance to parade itself as the shaper, staffer and broker for
the operating legal framework in this country. What is not
claimed is not attributed. This escape from responsibility for
the quality and quantity of justice in the relationships of men
and institutions has been a touchstone of the legal profession.
Anyone who wishes to understand the legal crises that envelop the contemporary scene-in the cities, in the environment,
in the courts, in the marketplace, in public services, in the
corporate-government arenas and in Washington-should come
to grips with this legal flow chart that begins with the law
schools and ends with the law firms, particularly the large corporate law firms of New York and Washington.
Harvard Law's most enduring contribution to legal education was the mixing of the case method of study with the Socratic method of teaching. Developed late in the nineteeth century under Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, these techniques were tailor-made to transform intellectual arrogance into
pedagogical systems that humbled the student into accepting its
premises, levels of abstractions and choice of subjects. Law professors take delight in crushing egos in order to acculturate the
students to what they called "legal reasoning" or "thinking like
a lawyer." The process is a highly sophisticated form of mind
control that trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for
freedom to roam in an intellectual cage.
The study of actual law cases-almost always at the appellate court level-combines with the Socratic questioning sequence in class to keep students continually on the defensive,
while giving them the feeling that they are learning hard law.
Inasmuch as the Socratic method is a game at which only one
(the professor) can play, the students are conditioned to react to
questions and issues which they have no role in forming or
stimulating. Such teaching forms have been crucial in perpetuating the status quo in teaching content. For decades, the law
school curriculum reflected with remarkable fidelity the commercial demands of law firm practice. Law firm determinants
of the content of courses nurtured a colossal distortion in priorities both as to the type of subject matter and the dimension
of its treatment. What determined the curriculum was the legal
interest that came with retainers. Thus, the curriculum pecking
order was predictable-Ztax, corporate, securities and property
law at the top and torts (personal injury) and criminal law,
among others, at the bottom. Although in terms of the seriousness of the legal interest and the numbers of people affected,
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torts and criminal law would command the heights, the reverse
was true, for the retainers were not as certain nor as handsome.
Courses on estate planning proliferated, there were none for
environmental planning until a few years ago. Other courses
dealt with collapsible corporations, but the cupboard was bare
for any student interested in collapsing tenements. Creditors'
rights were studied deeply; debtors' remedies were passed by
shallowly. Courses tracking the lucre and the prevailing ethos
did not embrace any concept of professional sacrifice and service
to the unrepresented poor or to public interests being crushed
by private power. Such service was considered a proper concern
of legal charity, to be dispensed by starved legal aid societies.
The generations of lawyers shaped by these law schools
in turn shaped the direction and quality of the legal system.
They came to this task severely unequipped except for the furtherance of their acquisitive drives. Rare was the law graduate
who had the faintest knowledge of the institutionalized illegality
of the cities in such areas as building and health code violations,
the endemic bribing of officialdom, the illegalities in the marketplace, from moneylending to food. Fewer still were the graduates who knew anything of the institutions that should have
been bathed in legal insight and compassion-hospitals, schools,
probate and other courts, juvenile and mental institutions and
prisons. Racialism, the gap between rich and poor, the seething
slums-these conditions were brought to the attention of law
firms by the illumination of city riots rather than the illumination of concerned intellects.
Even the techniques of analysis-the ultimate pride of the
law schools-were seriously deficient. Techniques which concede to vested interests a parochial role for the law and which
permit empirical starvation of portions of their subject matter
become techniques of paralysis. This was the case in the relation
of tort courses and motor vehicle injuries. Law as prevention,
law as incorporator of highway and vehicle engineering facts
and feasibilities was almost totally ignored. The emphasis was
on legal impact after crashes occurred, so as to assign liabilities
and determine damages between drivers. Another failure in
analysis was thematic of the entire curriculum. Normative
thinking-the "shoulds" and the "oughts"-was not recognized
as part and parcel of rigorous analytic skills. Although the
greatest forays in past legal scholarship, from the works of Roscoe Pound to those of Judge Jerome Frank, proceeded from a
cultivated sense of injustice, the nation's law schools down-
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played the normative inquiry as something of an intellectual
pariah. Thus the great legal challenges of access to large governmental and corporate institutio:as, the control of environmental pollution, the requisites of iaternational justice suffered
from the inattention of mechanized minds. There was little appreciation of how highly demanding an intellectual task it was
to develop constructs of justice and injustice within Holmes'
wise dictum that "the life of the law is not logic, it is experience." Great questions went unasked, and therefore unanswered.
Possibly the greatest failure of the law schools-a failure
of the faculty-was not to articulate a theory and practice of a
just deployment of legal manpower. With massive public interests deprived of effective legal rep:resentation, the law schools
continued to encourage recruits for law firms whose practice
militated against any such representation, even on a sideline,
pro bono basis. Lawyers labored for polluters, not anti-polluters, for sellers, not consumers, for corporations, not citizens, for
labor leaders, not rank and file, for, not against, rate increases
or weak standards before government agencies, for highway
builders, not displaced residents, for, not against, judicial and
administrative delay, for preferential business access to government and against equal citizen access to the same government,
for agricultural subsidies to the rich but not food stamps for
the poor, for tax and quota privileges, not for equity and free
trade. None of this and much more seemed to trouble the law
schools. Indeed, law firms were not even considered appropriate
subjects of discussion and study in the curriculum. The legal
profession-its organization, priorities and responsibilities-were
taken as given. As the one institution most suited for a critical
evaluation of the profession, the law school never assumed this
unique role. Rather, it serviced and supplied the firms with
fresh manpower selected through an archaic hierarchy of narrow
worthiness topped by the editors of the school's law review. In
essence it was a trade school.
The strains on this established legal order began to be felt
with Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954. Brown rubbed the
raw nerves of the established order in public. The mounting
conflict began to shake a legal order built on deception and
occult oppression. The ugly scars of the land burned red. Law
students began to sense, to feel, to participate, and to earn scars
of their own. Then came the Kennedy era with its verbal eloquence, its Peace Corps-overseas and later here. Then came
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Vietnam and Watts, Newark and the perturbation became a bigleague jolt. Law students began to turn away from private
practice, especially at the Ivy League law schools. Those who
went directly to the firms were less than enthusiastic. The big
corporate firms in New York and Washington began to detect
early signs that their boot camps were not responding to the
customary Loreleis of the metropolitan canyons. Starting salaries began to reflect the emergence of a seller's market. Almost two years ago, the big New York Cravath firm set a starting
salary of $15,000 a year and many firms followed. Still the law
graduate detour continued. The big firms began to promise
more free time to engage in pro bono work-the phrase used to
describe work in the public interest such as representing indigents. The young graduates were still dissatisfied-first over
the contraction of the promises and second over the narrow interpretation given to pro bono work.
At the same time, more new or alternative career roles in
public service began to emerge. Neighborhood Legal Services,
funded by OEO, was manned by 1,800 young lawyers around the
country at last count. The draft is driving many graduates into
VISTA programs. There are more federal court clerkships
available. And the growth of private, public-service law institutions such as Edgar Cahn's Citizen's Advocate Center and the
Urban Law Institute headed by his wife, Jean Cahn, are not only
providing such career roles but articulating their need throughout the country.
Meanwhile back at the law schools, student activism has
arrived. Advocacy of admission, curriculum and grading reform
is occurring at Harvard and Yale. Similar currents are appearing at other law schools. New courses in environmental, consumer and poverty law are being added to the lists. The first
few weeks of the present school year indicate that the activists'
attention is turning to the law firms that are now coming on
campus to recruit. In an unprecedented move, a number of detailed questionnaires, signed by large numbers of students, are
going out to these firms. The questions range far beyond the
expected areas of the firms' policies on minority and women
lawyers, and pro bono work. They include inquiries about the
firms' policies on containing their clients' ambitions, on participation in law-reform work, on conflict of interest issues, on involvement in corporate client and political activity, and on subsidizing public-interest legal activity. Such questionnaires are
preliminary to the development of courses on law-firm activities,
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and to more studies of specific law firms, which began this past
summer with a study of the largest Washington, D.C. firm, Covington and Burling.
The responses which the firms give to these questionnaires,
and whatever planned response the students envisage for those
firms who choose not to reply, willi further sharpen the issues
and the confrontations. The students have considerable leverage. They know it is a seller's market. They know how vulnerable these very private firms are to effective public criticism.
Status is crucial to these firms. Status is also a prime attraction
for competent law school graduates.
In recent months, there has been. much soul-searching among
the larger firms. Memos suggesting various opportunities for
pro bono work by younger associates have been circulating between partners. A few decisions have been made. Some New
York and San Francisco firms are considering or have instituted
time off allowances ranging from a few weeks a year to a sabbatical. Piper & Marbury, a large Baltimore firm, has announced its intention to establish a branch office in the slums
to service the needs of poor people, without charging fees if
there is an inability to pay anything. Arnold and Porter, the
second largest Washington, D.C. firm, has appointed a full time
pro bono lawyer and is permitting all firm members to spend,
if they wish, an average of 15 percent of their working hours on
public service activities. Hogan and Hartson, the third largest
D.C. firm, is setting up a "Community Services Department" to
"take on public interest representation on a non-chargeable or,
where appropriate, a discounted fee basis," according to the
firm's memorandum on the subject.
The Hogan and Hartson memorandum is a fairly candid
document. Like other firm memorandums on pro bono ventures, there is the acknowledgment that such a move "may have
a favorable impact upon recruitment." The executive committee of Hogan and Hartson concedes that "there is a tendency
among younger lawyers, particularly those with the highest academic qualifications, to seek out public-service oriented legal
careers as an alternative to practice in the larger metropolitan
law firms." In its internal firm statement, the committee notes
that it "regards the relative disfavor into which the major law
firms have fallen to be attributable, at least in part, to the feeling
among recent law school graduates that these firms have failed
to respond to the larger problems of contemporary society."
(Their emphasis.) Some statistics impressed the senior part-
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ners: the University of Michigan Law School reports that 26
of its 1969 graduates entered Wall Street law firms as compared
with an average of 75 in preceding years. Harvard Law School
reported that the percentage of its graduates entering private
law practice declined from 54 percent in 1964 to 41 percent in
1968, and an even more significant decline is expected in the
next few years.
It is too early to appraise these programs because they
have not yet gotten underway. The likelihood that serious or
abrasive conflict of interest situations will arise depends on the
kind of pro bono work selected. If this work deals with "bandaid law" in the slums on a case basis, few conflict of interest
problems should arise. On the other hand, should the pro bono
lawyers grapple with the financial institutions who fund the
slum moneylenders for example, or strive toward structural reform of a legal institution, then the probability of conflict is increased.
Because of the enormously greater cost-benefit which attaches to the more basic pro bono efforts, the external and internal pressures on the firm's leaders will be in that direction.
This could lead to more profound clashes betwen the firm's allegiance to its paying clients and its recognition of public service
responsibilities. With additional law student and younger lawyer demands for cash contributions for scholarships to minority
law students, for admission of more minority lawyers to firm
membership, and for senior partners to pay "reparations" out of
their own salaries to assist the legally deprived-all demands
made or in the process of being made-the pressure may soon
exceed the firms' threshold of tolerance. At that point the experiment in pro bono may terminate.
Whatever the outcome, the big firms will never be the same
again. They will either have to dedicate substantial manpower
and resources to public service, and somehow resolve the conflict
of interest problem, or they will decline in status to the level
of corporate house counsel or public relations firms. The polarization of the legal profession seems a more likely development.
Before he left Harvard almost two years ago to become U.S.
Solicitor General, Dean Griswold wrote of his belief that there
would be a "decline in the relative importance of private law
practice as we have known it in the past." This trend is in
fact occurring as far as the younger lawyers' concept of importance is concerned. However, the immense power of these firms
and their tailored capacity to apply know-how, know-who and
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other influences remains undiminished.
Recent evidence of the resourcefulness of large corporate
law firms in overwhelming the opposition on behalf of its clients
comes from the firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering. A firm
team, headed by Lloyd Cutler, obtained last month on behalf
of the domestic auto companies a feeble consent decree in return
for the Justice Department's dropping its civil antitrust case
charging the domestic auto companies with conspiracy to restrain the development and marketing of pollution control systems since 1953. Earlier Mr. Cutler succeeded in having the
Antitrust Division heed his representations that the original
policy to initiate criminal proceedings, after an 18-month grand
jury strongly wanted to return an indictment, be dropped. The
terms of the consent decree are being challenged by a number
of cities in federal district court at Los Angeles. The petitioners
allege that there are inadequate provisions for disclosure of the
conspiracy information and for long-term compliance, and that
the great deterrent effect of a public trial was lost. Without
going into further detail, it is sufficient to state that many law
students and younger lawyers see a divergence in such a case
between the lawyer's commitment to the public interest and
his commitment to the auto industry.
Professor Charles A. Reich of Yale Law School expressed one
form of this heightened expectatiorL of the lawyer's role as follows: "It is important to recognize explicitly that whether he
is engaged publicly or privately, the lawyer will no longer be
serving merely as the spokesman for others. As the law becomes more and more a determinative force in public and private
affairs, the lawyer must carry the responsibility of his specialized knowledge, and formulate ideas as well as advocate them.
In a society where law is a primary force, the lawyer must be a
primary, not a secondary, being."
The struggle of the established law firms to portrary themselves as merely legal counselors affording their corporate clients their right to legal representation is losing ground. So too
is their practice of hiding behind their responsibility to those
clients, and not taking the burdea of their advocacy as the
canons of ethics advise them to do wherever the public interest
is importantly involved. Either they are technical minions or
they bear the responsibility attendant upon their status as independent professionals.
Clearly, there is need for a new dimension to the legal profession. This need does not simply extend to those groups or
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individuals who cannot afford a lawyer. It extends to the immense proliferation of procedural and substantive interests
which go to the essence of the kind of society we will have in
the future, but which have no legal representation. The absence of remedy is tantamount to an absence of right. The engineer of remedies for exercising rights is the lawyer.
The yearning of more and more young lawyers and law
students is to find careers as public-interest lawyers who, independent of government and industry, will work on these two
major institutions to further the creative rule of law. The law,
suffering recurrent and deepening breakdowns, paralysis and
obsolescence, should no longer tolerate a retainer astigmatism
which allocates brilliant minds to trivial or harmful interests.

